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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and 
socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992-
2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk-taking 
incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a 
firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned 
relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant 
relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This 
could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased 
role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-
taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for 
corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities.  
 
Keywords: executive compensation, CEO risk-taking incentives, socially irresponsible 
activities.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received considerable attention 
by academics and practitioners as firms face pressure from various internal and external 
stakeholders to integrate CSR into company actions and operations (Borghesi et al., 2014, 
Crifo and Forget, 2015). CSR is defined as voluntary activities conducted by firms to achieve 
social goals (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In managerial terms, it means that the firm 
should be profitable, ethical and comply with the law (Carroll, 1999). These definitions focus 
more on socially responsible activities related to positive actions and outcomes, and less on 
the other side of the same coin, namely socially irresponsible activities related to negative 
actions and outcomes (Kotchen and Moon, 2012). This distinction is crucial as the same firm 
might be involved in both socially responsible and irresponsible activities (Mattingly and 
Berman, 2006; Scholtens and Zhou, 2008; Chatterji et al., 2009).  
The literature linking executive compensation and CSR have mainly focused on how 
specific components of compensation packages (i.e., salary, bonus, stock awards and stock 
options) affect firms' involvement in socially responsible or irresponsible activities (McGuire 
et al., 2003; Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005, 2006; Cai et al., 2011; Rekker 
et al., 2014).1 This literature provides mixed evidence, for example, McGuire et al. (2003) 
find that CEO salary and the percentage of long-term incentive payments (i.e., stock options 
and other long-term incentives) in the CEO’s compensation package have a positive 
association with socially irresponsible activities. In contrast, Mahoney and Thorne (2005) 
                                                          
1
 Most of the literature focused on the link between CSR and financial performance. This link has been studied 
from different angles ranging from firm value such as Tobin’s q (Surroca et al., 2010), stock returns (Kappou 
and Oikonomou, 2016), cost of debt and credit ratings (Oikonomou et al., 2014a), and financial risk 
(Oikonomou et al., 2012). Another strand of CSR research examined the relationship between a firm’s CSR and 
CEO characteristics (Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Manner, 2010; Chin et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2015). A 
recent review of the literature about integrating CSR in executive compensation policies can be found in 
Flammer et al. (2016).  
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find that long-term compensation (i.e., stock option grants divided by total compensation) is 
associated with lower socially irresponsible activities. Mahoney and Thorne (2006) find that 
CEO stock options are positively related to socially responsible activities. Deckop et al. 
(2006) find that CSR is negatively related to short-term compensation incentives (i.e., 
bonuses divided by total compensation) and positively related to long-term compensation 
incentives (i.e., restricted stocks and stock options divided by total compensation). A 
common characteristic of this literature is that it does not explicitly consider how risk-taking 
incentives embedded in the CEO compensation package affect firms’ involvement in socially 
irresponsible activities. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use an explicit 
measure of CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to 
change in stock return volatility or Vega) to examine its impact on socially irresponsible 
activities.2  
Equity-based compensation and corresponding incentives have been widely used by 
corporations to align the incentives of CEOs with their shareholders’ interests in order to take 
decisions that maximize firm value. In this paper, we argue that risk-taking incentives 
embedded in the CEO compensation package could affect firm’s involvement in socially 
irresponsible actions. We begin by noting that firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible 
activities is subject to managerial discretion, and therefore could be also influenced by 
managerial incentives (McGuire et al., 2003). Specifically, we hypothesize a positive 
relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. Two 
mechanisms could explain this fact. First, CEOs could be involved in socially irresponsible 
                                                          
2
 Our paper focuses on non-financial firms but it should be noted that some studies in the banking literature have 
investigated the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm’s performance, risk and probability to 
default. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that CEO risk-taking incentives do not affect bank performance. 
Cheng et al. (2015) find that riskier banks might offer higher total pay as compensation by observing a wide 
range of compensation components of the top five bank executives. Boyallian and Ruiz-Verdú (2015) find that 
managerial risk-taking incentives affect the probability of bank failure. 
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activities because of financial performance pressures linked to these risk-taking incentives. 
Second, managers may underestimate the potential negative implications of socially 
irresponsible activities (Tang et al., 2015).  
We also argue that the level of socially responsible activities of the firm moderates the 
relation between socially irresponsible activities and risk-taking incentives, such that the 
relationship will be stronger for firms with higher levels of socially responsible activities. 
This is motivated by the findings of a recent strand of research which suggests that socially 
irresponsible activities and socially responsible activities might be related (e.g., Strike et al., 
2006; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Kotchen and Moon, 2012; 
Ormiston and Wong, 2013). In addition, recent research suggests that socially responsible 
activities help CEOs accrue moral credits, which in turn allow them to be involved in socially 
irresponsible activities without discrediting themselves or their firms (Ormiston and Wong, 
2013). Therefore, we expect that the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and 
firm involvement in socially irresponsible activities will be strengthened when a firm is 
involved in socially responsible activities. 
In order to analyse whether risk-taking incentives embedded in CEO compensation are 
related to socially irresponsible activities, we examine a large sample of US firms over the 
period 1992-2012. We use the MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD) database which evaluates 
companies in terms of socially responsible and irresponsible activities. For the period before 
the 2007 financial crisis, our results suggest a positive and statistically significant effect of 
CEO risk-taking incentives on firm’s socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that 
this relationship is stronger for firms that have a higher prior level of socially responsible 
activities. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant 
relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This 
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could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased 
role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Our contributions to the CSR-compensation literature are as follows. First, we use an 
explicit measure of CEO risk-taking incentives measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth 
held in options to change in stock return volatility or Vega (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 
2002; Coles et al., 2006) and we examine its impact on socially irresponsible activities. 
Second, our study complements previous research suggesting that socially irresponsible 
activities need a separate treatment (Strike et al., 2006). Third, we try to shed light on the 
debate about why firms might be involved in socially irresponsible activities as empirical 
evidence on this is very limited so far (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Ormiston and Wong, 
2013). Fourth, our results suggest that the structure of CEO compensation may be used as a 
tool to implement the social responsibility agenda of a company. For example, the board of 
directors would be interested to understand how risk-taking incentives could 
encourage/discourage the CEO from being involved in socially irresponsible activities. 
Finally, our results are also particularly relevant for policy decisions, in light of the increased 
interest by stakeholders, such as investors and policy makers, in the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive compensation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses our results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses development  
In this section, we start by describing the CEO risk-taking incentives embedded in the 
compensation package. Then, we explain the potential impact that these incentives might 
have on socially irresponsible activities.  
2.1. CEO risk-taking incentives 
In order to better understand managerial incentives, we start by considering the 
composition of the CEO compensation package. Generally, CEO total compensation includes 
non-equity compensation (e.g., base salary and bonuses) plus equity-based compensation 
(i.e., stock options and stock awards).3 Half of the total CEO compensation, in S&P 500 firms 
in 2011, is based on stock options and stock awards (Murphy, 2013). In 2011, the average 
CEO Pay of S&P 500 firms is $12.3 million (Murphy, 2013). 
The most important source of risk-taking incentives originates from stock options 
(Murphy, 2013). One of the important characteristics of stock option compensation is its non-
linear (convex) payoff (Hull, 2009). That is, the payoff is asymmetric (capped maximum loss 
versus an unlimited maximum profit). When the stock price is higher than the exercise price, 
the upside potential is unlimited. However, when the stock price falls below the exercise 
price, the loss is limited.  
Hence, stock options provide the CEO natural incentives to take greater risks through an 
increase in the firm’s stock return volatility. Therefore, the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in 
options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, has been commonly used in the 
literature as a proxy for CEO risk-taking incentives. Vega is defined as the change in the 
                                                          
3
 Total compensation includes base salary, bonuses, non-equity incentives, stock options and awards, and other 
pay (e.g., pension benefits).  
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value of the CEO’s option portfolio due to a 1% increase in firm’s stock volatility (Guay, 
1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). Several studies have shown that higher Vega 
CEOs take riskier investments and financing policies (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2013). The CEO has been commonly characterized as risk 
averse and undiversified (Murphy, 2013). In this context, the challenge for the board of 
directors, on behalf of shareholders, is to choose the right level of incentives for the CEO to 
take enough risk and drive value creation, without incurring in excessive risk-taking. 
As mentioned in the introduction, several studies have investigated the link between 
executive compensation and CSR activities (e.g., McGuire et al., 2003; Mahoney and Thorne, 
2006; Cai et al., 2011). However, these studies examine the relationship between CSR and 
the level of specific compensation components, such as salary, bonuses, or options held by 
the CEO. While this is important as it increases our understanding of the link between CSR 
and executive compensation, these studies do not address the important question as to 
whether the incentives embedded in the compensation components encourage or discourage 
managers to be involved in socially irresponsible activities. Our paper aims to fill this gap by 
exploring how CEO risk-taking incentives (measured by Vega) might affect firm’s 
involvement in socially irresponsible activities.  
2.2. Risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities 
Agency theory and transaction cost economics suggest that the CEO compensation 
package should be designed in such way that it limits or controls opportunism or self-interest 
seeking, for example through monitoring, interest-aligning mechanisms, and performance 
incentives (Jones and Wicks, 1999). Agency theory suggests that compensation plans should 
be designed to align the interests of both CEOs and their shareholders (Murphy, 2013). The 
composition of the CEO compensation package shapes his/her risk-taking incentives and this 
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has been observed in both financial and non-financial firms (Coles et al., 2006; Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013; Murphy, 2013; Cheng et al., 2015; Boyallian and 
Ruiz-Verdú, 2015).  
The board of directors can use compensation schemes in order to influence executives’ 
behaviours, through risk-taking incentives embedded within the CEO compensation 
packages, which in turn could affect firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities. 
Since socially responsible and irresponsible activities are usually subject to managerial 
discretion (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), they could be heavily influenced by managerial 
incentives (McGuire et al., 2003). CEOs could be driven by financial objectives and 
competitive pressure, which in turn could lead the firm to be involved in socially 
irresponsible activities.4 Moreover, managers may underestimate the potential negative 
implications of socially irresponsible activities. Tang et al. (2015) find that CEOs are more 
likely to engage in socially irresponsible activities because they tend to ignore the importance 
of stakeholders in terms of support and resources. Tang et al. (2015) argue that CEOs may be 
involved in socially irresponsible activities because of their beliefs that they can deal with all 
negative consequences that might arise. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and 
firm involvement in socially irresponsible activities. 
 
                                                          
4
 An important strand of the literature looks at the potential bilateral link between CSR and firm risk (Scholtens, 
2008). The general finding of this literature is that CSR reduces firm risk. For example, some studies examine 
the relation between CSR and the cost of capital (Feldman et al. 1997; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Sharfman and 
Fernando 2008; El Ghoul et al. 2011). Other studies examine the relationship between CSR and firm risk during 
the financial crisis period (Bouslah et al., 2016). Oikonomou et al. (2012) find that firms involved in 
controversial activities are associated with a higher degree of stock market risk. 
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2.3. The moderating effect of socially responsible activities  
 A recent strand of research suggests that socially irresponsible and socially responsible 
activities might be related. Some studies find that both socially responsible and irresponsible 
activities can occur simultaneously (e.g., Strike et al., 2006; Mattingly and Berman, 2006), 
other studies find that prior socially irresponsible activities affect subsequent socially 
responsible activities (e.g., Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Kotchen and Moon, 2012), and other 
studies find that prior socially responsible activities affect subsequent socially irresponsible 
activities (e.g., Ormiston and Wong, 2013). Strike et al., (2006) find that internationally 
diversified firms are likely to be simultaneously involved in socially responsible and 
irresponsible activities. Mattingly and Berman (2006) find that both socially responsible and 
irresponsible activities are positively correlated suggesting that firms can potentially engage 
in both activities.  
 Other studies find that socially irresponsible activities affect socially responsible activities. 
For example, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) show that firms improve their environmental 
performance after receiving a poor environmental rating. Kotchen and Moon (2012) find that 
companies engage in socially responsible activities in order to offset (compensate) socially 
irresponsible activities, but the effect varies across industries and categories of socially 
responsible and irresponsible activities. Kang et al. (2016) find that firms seem to use socially 
responsible activities strategically as a penance mechanism in order to offset their past 
missteps in order to appease their stakeholders. However, the authors find that this penance 
mechanism does not pay off financially perhaps because stakeholders interpret it as 
unauthentic or even as deceitful (e.g., seeking to “greenwash” past mistakes). This could be 
explained by two theoretical perspectives: (i) the notion of cue diagnosticity of corporate 
character (i.e., using cues which are relevant information or something that is considered by 
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stakeholders to be potentially informative) from social judgment theory (Mishina et al., 2012) 
and (ii) arguments regarding the imputation of corporate motives (Godfrey, 2005).  
Mishina et al. (2012) argue that stakeholders make reputational judgments based on positive 
and negative cues about the firm’s character reputation (e.g., socially responsible or 
irresponsible activities).5 In particular, negative cues tend to receive higher weight than 
positive cues because they are viewed as deviations from the norm that is socially expected 
(Mishina et al., 2012). Godfrey (2005) argues that stakeholders impute moral values to firm’s 
intentions, motivations and character. The greater (lower) the stakeholders view socially 
responsible activities as a truly manifestation of the firm’s character, the greater (lower) the 
moral judgment will be. Alternatively, firms using socially responsible activities to ingratiate 
themselves with stakeholders will receive negative evaluations (Godfrey, 2005).  
Consistent with the arguments of Mishina et al. (2012) and Godfrey (2005), Oikonomou et al 
(2014b) find that portfolios of firms having both socially responsible activities and socially 
irresponsible activities tend to significantly underperform portfolios of firms having socially 
responsible activities only or portfolios of firms having socially irresponsible activities only. 
Kang et al. (2016) find that using socially responsible activities to offset past socially 
irresponsible activities does not attenuate the negative performance implication of socially 
irresponsible activities. This suggests that the involvement in socially irresponsible activities 
could be due to other factors, such as CEO risk-taking incentives provided by the CEO 
compensation packages.  
 We argue that the level of socially responsible activities of the firm will moderate the 
relation between risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities, such that the 
                                                          
5
 Stakeholder judgments are complex and could include the firm’s involvement in socially responsible and 
irresponsible activities. 
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relationship will be stronger for firms with higher levels of socially responsible activities. In 
other words, the relationship between socially irresponsible activities and CEO risk-taking 
incentives could be intensified by the presence of socially responsible activities.   
 To provide additional theoretical support to our arguments regarding the moderating role 
of socially responsible activities on the relation between risk-taking incentives and socially 
irresponsible activities, we draw upon psychology and strategic management research (e.g., 
Mishina et al., 2012; Ormiston and Wong, 2013; Henisz et al., 2014). Ormiston and Wong 
(2013) argue that CEOs could accrue moral credits by undertaking socially responsible 
activities, which allow them to be involved in socially irresponsible activities.  
 A closely related concept to “moral credit” is the “social license to operate”. Henisz et al. 
(2014) show that social license to operate is essential to conducting business and is a driver of 
financial performance in the gold mining sector. In this context, socially responsible activities 
are undertaken to maintain the social license (e.g. the right to operate, which is granted 
formally and directly by some stakeholders such as the government), but also informally and 
indirectly by other stakeholders (e.g., local communities). Socially responsible activities help 
the firm to reduce conflict and increase cooperation with stakeholders. The above theoretical 
arguments suggest that CEOs accruing moral credits and the legitimacy to operate may be 
induced to take more risk (e.g., by being involved in socially irresponsible activities) without 
discrediting themselves or their firms. This effect will be exacerbated if CEOs also 
underestimate the potential negative implications of socially irresponsible activities.  
 Socially responsible activities could also be viewed as an intangible asset, which could be 
associated with a buffer to take more risk (e.g. by being involved in socially irresponsible 
actions). Alternatively, socially responsible activities may create a shield against the 
reputational losses associated with socially irresponsible activities. For example, a CEO with 
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high risk-taking incentives may focus on maximizing profits for shareholders, potentially 
resulting in socially irresponsible activities (e.g., using a polluting technology or a poor waste 
management which are harmful to the environment). This behaviour is very risky from the 
point of view of the CEO in the sense that if the worst case scenario happens, the market 
penalty will be substantial and could even threaten the survival of the company. The work of 
Bhattacharya and Sen (2004), Godfrey (2005), and Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) 
suggest that socially responsible activities help the firm building a reservoir of goodwill 
which induces stakeholders to downplay or minimize the negative information about the firm. 
The above reasoning leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm involvement 
in socially irresponsible activities will be strengthened when the firm has 
been previously involved in socially responsible activities. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Measuring corporate socially (ir)responsible activities 
To measure socially responsible and irresponsible activities, we use the MSCI ESG 
STATS (formerly KLD), which covers U.S. listed companies from 1992 to 2012. KLD 
database provides binary ratings for several criteria across seven dimensions: Community 
Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Products, Human Rights, and Corporate 
Governance.6 It allows us to identify companies that have been involved in socially 
responsible or irresponsible activities. Socially responsible and irresponsible activities are 
                                                          
6
 Appendix II shows the MSCI ESG STATS (KLD)’s strength and concern indicators for each of the seven 
dimensions covered by KLD.  
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conceptually different, subject to different dynamics, and have different implications for 
firms (Semenova and Hassel, 2015; Tang et al., 2015). We use firm’s strengths as a proxy for 
socially responsible activities, and firm’s concerns as a proxy for socially irresponsible 
activities (e.g., Strike et al., 2006; Borghesi et al., 2014).  
 We compute an index of socially irresponsible activities (CON) as follows. First, we 
compute the yearly average concern score for each KLD dimension. Second, we compute the 
index of socially irresponsible activities (CON) as the arithmetic average across the seven 
KLD dimensions. We also compute an index of socially responsible activities (STR) in a 
similar way as the index of socially irresponsible activities (CON). We first compute yearly 
average strength score for each KLD dimension. We then compute the index of socially 
responsible activities (STR) as the arithmetic average across the seven KLD dimensions.7  
CEO risk-taking incentives 
Our CEO characteristics and compensation data come from the Standard & Poor’s 
Execucomp database for the period 1992 - 2012. This database contains extensive 
information on CEO compensation items for S&P 1500 firms. As a proxy for CEO risk-
taking incentives, we use the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to firm risk (Vega), 
which measures the change of CEO wealth for a 1% increase in stock price volatility.8 A high 
value of this variable is commonly associated with high risk-taking incentives of the CEO as 
                                                          
7
 Some studies have pointed out some limitations of the KLD data (Mattingley and Berman, 2006, Chatterji et 
al., 2009). For example, Chatterji et al. (2009) compare the environmental performance based on KLD data with 
the environmental performance based on Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data. They find that KLD 
environmental concerns to be fairly good summaries of past environmental performance, whereas KLD 
environmental strengths cannot predict precisely environmental performance. In spite of these limitations, KLD 
data is the most widely used CSR database in academic research.   
8
 Please refer to Coles et al. (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) for detailed calculation of the variables. 
Appendix III provides detailed information about the calculation of Vega of the CEO. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
14 
 
it may induce risky investment choices. CEO seeks to benefit from increases in share price 
volatility that results from risky investments (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our variables. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 
index of socially irresponsible activities or concern measure (CON) ranges between 0 and 
0.681 with a mean (median) value of 0.073 (0.056) and a standard deviation of 0.07. The 
index of socially responsible activities or strength measure (STR) ranges between 0 and 0.843 
with a mean (median) value of 0.052 (0.024) and a standard deviation of 0.085. The mean 
(median) strength (STR) is lower than the mean (median) concern (CON) suggesting that the 
average firm has more concerns than strengths. The difference in mean (median) values is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.9  
[Insert Table 1] 
CEO control variables 
The CEO control variables are based on previous research on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as well as CEO managerial incentives and compensation. We consider 
CEO Tenure, CEO Cash compensation, CEO age and the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in 
options to stock price performance (Delta) (Coles, et al., 2006).  
CEO cash compensation and CEO tenure (the number of years the CEO has been in 
his/her current role) capture CEO’s risk aversion (Coles et al., 2006). Guay (1999) argues that 
high cash compensation reduces CEO’s risk aversion. The age of the CEO is expressed in 
years as reported in the annual proxy statement. We also control for the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth held in options to stock price performance (Delta) which is defined as the change in 
                                                          
9
 The t-test for the difference in mean has a t-stat of 29.1 with zero p-value, whereas the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test for the difference in median has a z-stat of 43.72 with zero p-value.  
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the dollar value of the CEO wealth held in options for a 1% change in the stock price. Higher 
delta increases the incentives of a CEO to increase shareholder value because of the stock and 
option holdings, but it also exposes the risk-averse and undiversified CEO to more risk which 
could discourage the CEO from undertaking positive NPV projects if they are very risky 
(Coles et al., 2006; Murphy, 2013).  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the typical CEO has a mean (median) Vega of $151,742 
($65,619), and a mean (median) Delta of $787,347 ($245,022). In other words, the typical 
CEO enjoys an increase of $65,619 in his/her wealth for a 1% increase in stock return 
volatility, and an increase of $245,022 for a 1% increase in the stock price. The mean 
(median) age of a CEO is 55.69 (56) years with a mean (median) tenure of 5.36 (4) years.  
Firm control variables 
Based on existing CSR literature (Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005, 
2006; Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Manner, 2010; Cai et al., 2011; Chin et al., 2013; 
Rekker et al., 2014; Tang et al., 2015), we include a set of firm characteristics as 
determinants of firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities. Control variables, 
together with their expected signs, include: Firm size (SIZE (+)), Leverage (BLEVERAGE (-
)),10 Research and Development (R&D (+)), Capital expenditures (CAPEX (-)), Return on 
Assets (ROA (-)),11 Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE (+)), Surplus Cash (S_CASH 
(+/-)), Firm Risk (VOLATILITYD (+)) and Market-to-Book value of assets (MB (+)) to 
                                                          
10
 We also consider using market leverage (MLEVERAGE) defined as total book debt divided by market value 
of total assets, but the correlation with book leverage is high (0.87). 
11
 We also consider two alternative profitability measures: Stock Return (RETURNS) measured as the annual 
return over the fiscal year and Cumulative Returns (CUMTRET) measured as the annually compounded daily 
stock returns. The results remain unchanged.  
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capture investment opportunities of the firm.12 All control variables are defined in Appendix 
I.  
The expected sign on the SIZE coefficient is positive. Larger firms are more exposed to 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Dimson et al. (2015) find that larger firms are 
more likely to be targeted by activist investors. Since larger firms usually have more fixed 
assets (PPE), higher R&D expenses (R&D) and higher investment opportunities (MB), we 
would expect these variables to be also positively related to the index of socially irresponsible 
activities (CON). The effect of BLEVERAGE on socially irresponsible activities is expected 
to be negative because debt serves as disciplinary mechanism that prevent managers from 
diverting/committing cash to unprofitable projects that generate private benefits (Ferrell et 
al., 2016). Higher values of S_CASH provide managers with the most latitude as to how and 
when to spend it (Ferrell et al., 2016), suggesting an ambiguous expected sign in the case of 
irresponsible activities. We include CAPEX in our models based on the assumption that firms 
that adopt a long-term view (e.g., investing in environment-friendly production processes and 
in product quality improvements) are less exposed to socially irresponsible activities. Firm 
profitability (ROA) may also have a negative effect on irresponsible actions, as firms with a 
good financial performance tend to perform well in CSR activities. Finally, as riskier 
strategies could lead to socially irresponsible activities, the VOLATILITYD coefficient is 
expected to be positive. Panel C in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of firm 
characteristics.  
                                                          
12
 Following a referee’s suggestion, we also included the variable "CEO compensation paid in options as a 
percentage of total CEO compensation" as an additional control variable. The results showed that the coefficient 
associated with this variable is not significant regardless of the estimation method used. These results are 
available from the authors upon request.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
The final sample has 18,496 CEO-firm-year observations, which correspond to 3,934 
CEOs for 2,055 unique firms resulting from merging four databases: Standard & Poor’s 
Execucomp, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and MSCI ESG STATS or KLD over the period 1992-
2012. All variables have been winsorized at 1% and 99% of their empirical distribution to 
eliminate the effect of outliers. In line with the research design of previous studies, financial 
firms (SIC code: 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC code: 4900-4999) are excluded due to 
different reporting standards which may cause problems in terms of data comparability. 
Table 2 presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients among all variables used in this 
paper. Although the strengths and concerns are positively correlated, the magnitude of this 
correlation is relatively low (0.2766) suggesting that socially irresponsible activities and 
socially responsible activities are two different concepts and should be examined separately 
as they are subjects to different dynamics (McGuire et al., 2003, Mattingly and Berman, 
2006; Goss and Roberts, 2011). This reinforces the validity of our study since we are 
focusing on socially irresponsible activities, although our empirical analysis controls for 
socially responsible activities. Table 2 shows that correlations are low, which suggests that 
multicollinearity is not an issue for our estimations.  
[Insert Table 2] 
3.2. Methodology 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of CEO risk-taking incentives on 
socially irresponsible activities. In order to achieve this objective, we extend the literature on 
the main determinants of socially irresponsible activities (e.g., Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney 
and Thorne, 2005, 2006; Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Manner, 2010; Tang et al., 2015) by 
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including CEO risk-taking incentives (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Daniel 
et al., 2013). We propose the following empirical model:  
, = 			
,, ,, 	,, 	,   (1) 
where , refers to an index of socially irresponsible activities based on KLD 
concerns, and ,	is the CEO risk-taking incentives of firm i at time t. , refers to an 
index of socially responsibility activities based on KLD strengths. Firm and CEO control 
variables were described in the previous section. All the independent variables are lagged one 
period in order to mitigate endogeneity issues.13 We include industry dummy variables based 
on the classification of Fama-French (1997). Year dummies are also included to control for 
differences across years.  
In order to test whether socially responsible activities strengthen the effect of CEO risk-
taking incentives on socially irresponsible actions, we extend equation (1) by including an 
interaction term between CEO risk-taking incentives and the index of socially responsible 
activities. 
, = 			
,, ,, , ∗ ,, 	,, 	,        (2) 
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using pooled OLS as well as panel data estimation 
techniques. Panel data models are useful to control for firm unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) are the two most usual panel data methods. The choice 
between FE and RE estimators is based on a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The results of 
the Hausman test suggest that the FE model is preferred. Nevertheless, we report FE and RE 
estimations for comparison purposes. 
                                                          
13
 Oikonomou et al. (2014a) use a similar methodological approach to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
19 
 
 Our regression specification assumes that Vega is exogenous. However, this might not be 
the case if some of the independent variables and/or unobserved variables that are not 
controlled for could affect both Vega and socially irresponsible activities (CON). Thus, Vega 
might be endogenous. Therefore, we use an instrumental variables (IV) model estimated 
using a two-stage efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We use the following 
instruments: (i) the average Vega of firms having their headquarters located in the same state 
and (ii) the average Vega for the industry in which the firm operates. The validity of the 
instruments is tested using Hansen test (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We also conducted an 
endogeneity test (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), which suggest that the use of OLS and panel 
data estimation techniques is appropriate. Nevertheless, the results from the IV-GMM 
regression models are reported for comparison purposes.   
4. Results 
4.1. CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Socially Irresponsible Activities  
Based on our theoretical framework, we test whether CEO Vega is associated with 
socially irresponsible activities (CON). We carry out the analysis for three periods: before the 
financial crisis (pre-2007), after the financial crisis (post-2007) and the full sample period 
(1992 - 2012). As explained in the methodology part, we estimate our regressions using four 
different estimation methods: pooled OLS, fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), and the 
instrumental variable approach (IV). Table 3 summarizes the results of testing our first 
hypothesis where the dependent variable is an index of firm’s involvement in socially 
irresponsible activities. For every period, the first, second, third and fourth column report the 
results using pooled OLS, FE, RE and IV, respectively. This allows us to examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the estimation method used.  
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We first discuss the results for each period separately. Regarding the pre-crisis period, 
Table 3 shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient of CEO risk-taking 
incentives, as measured by CEO Vega, regardless of the estimation method used. This result 
provides empirical support for the first hypothesis which suggests that CEO risk-taking 
incentives exert a positive effect on firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities. To 
evaluate the economic significance of the estimated coefficients, we scale the standard 
deviation of Vega by the average CEO’s total cash compensation and multiply this factor by 
the value of the coefficient associated with Vega.14 In this respect, the results in Table 3 show 
that an increase in Vega by one standard deviation increases the firm’s involvement in 
socially irresponsible activities by 0.36%-0.69% or about 5.6%-10.75% of the average level 
of the index of socially irresponsible activities, depending on the estimation method used.15  
In line with previous studies, Table 3 shows a significant and positive coefficient 
associated with socially responsible activities (STR), except when using the FE method. This 
suggests that previous involvement in socially responsible activities exert a positive effect on 
future socially irresponsible activities. To assess the economic significance, we calculate the 
effect on socially irresponsible activities of one standard deviation change in socially 
responsible activities. We multiply the standard deviation of the variable STR by the value of 
the coefficient associated with the variable STR. Thus, an increase in STR by one standard 
deviation increases the firm’s socially irresponsible activities by 0.35%-0.52% or about 
                                                          
14
 Note that Vega is expressed in thousands of US dollars, whereas our measure of socially irresponsible 
activities is calculated as an average.  
15
 For example, an increase in Vega by one standard deviation increases the firm’s involvement in socially 
irresponsible activities by about 0.36% (i.e., 0.168 × 0.0214) or about 5.6% (i.e., 0.0036 /0.064 = 0.056) of the 
average concerns, when using the fixed effects method. 
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5.47%-8.03% of the average level of a firm’s socially irresponsible activities, depending on 
the estimation method used.16  
As for the control variables, we find that on average socially irresponsible activities are 
higher for firms that are larger, spend more in R&D, have less surplus Cash, and are more 
risky. Furthermore, younger CEOs and CEOs with high tenure are less likely to engage their 
firms in socially irresponsible activities. These results are consistent with the previous 
literature (Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005, 2006; Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 
2009; Manner, 2010; Cai et al., 2011; Chin et al., 2013; Rekker et al., 2014; Tang et al., 
2015). 
[Insert Table 3] 
The results for the pre-crisis period are different from those for the post-crisis period. 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of CEO risk-taking incentives is not statistically significant 
in three out of the four methods used (OLS, RE, IV) during the post-crisis period. The only 
exception is when using the FE method where the coefficient associated to CEO Vega is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% percent level.  
The results for the post-crisis do not support our first hypothesis which suggests a positive 
relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm involvement in socially 
irresponsible activities. Instead, the results in the post-crisis period do not show evidence of a 
significant relationship. This could be due to the increased scrutiny on compensation 
packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
The relationship between socially irresponsible and socially responsible activities is also 
                                                          
16
 For example, an increase in socially responsible activities by one standard deviation increases the firm’s 
socially irresponsible activities by 0.35% (i.e., 0.053 × 0.0659) or about 5.47% of the average CON (i.e., 
0.0035/0.064 = 0.0547) , when using the random effects method.  
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different between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Table 3 shows that the coefficient 
associated with the variable STR changes its sign during the post-crisis period and becomes 
negative and significant in two out of the four methods used (FE and RE).    
For the overall period (1992-2012), we find that socially irresponsible activities are 
positively related to CEO risk-taking incentives. These results support our first hypothesis of 
a positive relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm involvement in socially 
irresponsible activities. In economic terms, an increase in Vega by one standard deviation 
increases the firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities by 0.19%-0.47% or about 
2.66%-6.44% of the average level of socially irresponsible activities, depending on the 
estimation method used. 
4.2. The moderating effect of socially responsible activities 
Table 4 summarizes the results of testing our second hypothesis related to the moderating 
effect of socially responsible activities on the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives 
and socially irresponsible activities. Results suggest that there is no overall effect of either 
VEGA or STR on socially irresponsible activities, but there is a statistically significant 
interaction in the pre-crisis period. During the post-crisis period and the overall period (1992-
2012), results are not conclusive with VEGA and the interaction terms being insignificant or 
only marginally significant, regardless of the estimation method used.    
As discussed above, the coefficient associated with the interaction variable prior to the 
financial crisis is strongly significant and positive. This represents a situation of a crossover 
interaction effect: the CEO risk-taking incentives and socially responsible activities (STR) do 
not seem to influence individually the firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities. 
Instead, it is the interaction of the CEO risk-taking incentives with socially responsible 
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activities that influence socially irresponsible activities. This suggests that CEO risk-taking 
incentives exert a positive effect on socially irresponsible activities, mainly for firms having a 
high level of socially responsible activities. This confirms the second hypothesis for the pre-
crisis period, which holds that the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm 
involvement in socially irresponsible activities will be stronger when firms are also involved 
in socially responsible activities. 
 [Insert Table 4] 
In summary, the results reported in Table 3 and 4 support our hypotheses for the pre-crisis 
period: CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities, 
and this relation is stronger for firms that have a higher level of prior socially responsible 
activities. However, for the post-crisis period, we do not find empirical support for the 
relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. The 
differences in the results between the two periods could be explained by the increased 
scrutiny regarding compensation and governance practices along with an increased interest 
on firm’s CSR practices as a consequence of the 2007 financial crisis.  
4.3. Robustness  
Our main findings indicate that CEO risk-taking incentives are associated with socially 
irresponsible activities, and this association is more prevalent when the firm has already 
undertaken socially responsible activities. This conclusion holds only for the pre-crisis 
period. In order to ensure the robustness of our findings in the previous section, we divide our 
sample into two subsamples based on the median value of the index of socially responsible 
activities (STR). The first (second) subsample includes all firms where the value of the index 
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of socially responsible activities is lower (higher) than the median STR value. We re-estimate 
equation (1) for both subsamples.  
 [Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 reports the results for the subsamples of firms with a high and low level of 
socially responsible activities for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The results for firms 
with high prior socially responsible activities shows that the coefficient associated with the 
CEO Vega continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the pre-
crisis period, regardless of the method used. In terms of economic significance, an increase in 
Vega by one standard deviation increases the firm’s socially irresponsible activities by 
0.32%-0.52% or about 5.00%-8.05% of the average level of socially irresponsible activities. 
Those results are similar to those reported in the previous section. Table 5 also shows that the 
results for the post-crisis period are in general not significant for both groups of firms. 
Overall, the results for firms with high prior STR during the pre-crisis period shown in Table 
5 are consistent with those reported for the full sample, which confirms our conjecture that 
CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities are positively related for 
firms with high level of socially responsible activities.17  
                                                          
17
 We are grateful for an anonymous referee who raised a very important issue related to the aggregation of the 
concerns of different dimensions of social responsibility. For example, Scholtens and Zhou (2008) and Chatterji 
et al. (2009) show that the different dimensions of social responsibility do matter. Moreover, the dimensions 
may differ for different investors and different stakeholders. Although examining the impact of risk-taking 
incentives across each of the individual dimensions of social responsibility is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
repeated the analysis for each individual dimensions of CSR. The results are not reported for the sake of brevity 
but are available upon request. Overall, the results show that some dimensions matter, whereas others do not. In 
sum, risk-taking incentives as measured by Vega seem to be important for the socially irresponsible activities of 
certain dimensions (e.g., diversity, employee, environment, product and governance), but to different extents. 
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5. Conclusion 
We analyse the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and 
socially irresponsible activities for U.S. firms during the period 1992-2012. We find that, 
during the pre-crisis period, CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially 
irresponsible activities, and that this relation is stronger for firms that have a higher level of 
prior socially responsible activities. The results during the post-crisis period differ and show 
no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially 
irresponsible activities. This might be explained by the increased scrutiny on compensation 
packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
Our findings are consistent with those of previous studies which suggest that 
compensation packages which embed high risk-taking incentives encourage the CEO to 
engage in riskier strategies which may include (or lead to) socially irresponsible activities. 
This might result from financial performance pressures associated with these risk-taking 
incentives or because of the CEO’s underestimation of the potential negative implications of 
these socially irresponsible activities. 
Our results are also consistent with previous literature suggesting that socially 
irresponsible activities and socially responsible activities might be related (e.g., Strike et al., 
2006; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Kotchen and Moon, 2012; 
Ormiston and Wong, 2013). Our findings also complement previous studies which found that 
the components of executive compensation (i.e., salary, bonus, stock and stock option) affect 
firms' involvement in CSR (McGuire et al., 2003; Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thorne, 
2005, 2006; Cai et al., 2011; Rekker et al., 2014).  
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Overall, the findings presented in this study have important policy implications regarding 
the importance and impact of the structure of compensation on the firm’s involvement in 
socially irresponsible activities. Furthermore, the present study augments previous literature 
on the compensation and CSR link, and makes a case for the board of directors to pay more 
attention to the implications of CEO compensation schemes and its associated incentives for 
the firm’s involvement in socially irresponsible activities. Given that our study focuses on 
large listed US companies, future research might investigate socially irresponsible activities 
for non-listed companies located in both the US and other countries. This would allow a 
greater understanding of the determinants of socially irresponsible activities and the influence 
of CEO risk-taking incentives on those activities.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
         
Panel A: Social (ir)responsibility variables 
     
CON 0.073 0.056 0.070 0 0.681 1.861 8.694 18496 
STR 0.052 0.024 0.085 0 0.843 3.359 18.611 18496 
         
Panel B: CEO variables 
       
VEGA 151.742 65.619 236.326 0 1426.718 3.128 14.463 17501 
DELTA 787.347 245.022 1890.294 4.564 14245.210 5.285 34.201 16880 
TENURE_CUM 5.361 4 3.836 1 21 1.129 3.980 18496 
AGE 55.688 56 7.265 28 96 0.271 3.884 17699 
         
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
      
SIZE 7.640 7.542 1.478 4.711 11.561 0.333 2.668 18493 
BLEVERAGE 0.237 0.200 0.243 0 1.527 2.413 12.080 18421 
R&D 0.030 0.004 0.048 0 0.227 2.034 6.885 18493 
CAPEX 0.056 0.041 0.051 0.003 0.281 2.043 7.935 17665 
ROA 0.139 0.133 0.088 -0.134 0.417 0.199 4.315 18455 
PPE 0.280 0.218 0.217 0.013 0.886 1.007 3.206 18453 
S_CASH 0.094 0.082 0.088 -0.122 0.381 0.699 4.136 18289 
VOLATILITYD 0.413 0.372 0.187 0.152 1.129 1.398 5.349 18224 
MB 2.013 1.628 1.202 0.796 7.535 2.296 9.205 18486 
 
Note: All variables are defined in Appendix I. The variables DELTA, VEGA are in $000s. The variable TENURE_CUM 
and AGE are in years. The Skewness and Kurtosis measures for each of the variables are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 2: Pearson’s correlation coefficients  
 
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
CON (1) 1               
STR (2) 0.2766* 1              
VEGA (3) 0.2648* 0.3312* 1             
DELTA (4) 0.0481* 0.1014* 0.3529* 1            
TENURE_CUM (5) 0.0091 0.0171 0.1700* 0.2022* 1           
AGE (6) 0.0507* 0.0257 0.0454* 0.0855* 0.3149* 1          
SIZE (7) 0.4591* 0.4549* 0.5115* 0.2281* 0.0306* 0.0869* 1         
MB (8) -0.0919* 0.0242 0.1280* 0.2932* -0.0319* -0.0840* -0.1428* 1        
BLEVERAGE (9) 0.1284* 0.0667* -0.008 -0.0711* 0.0004 0.0267 0.2616* -0.2589* 1       
R&D (10) -0.0527* 0.0368* 0.0363* 0.0008 -0.0016 -0.1184* -0.1843* 0.2762* -0.2168* 1      
CAPEX (11) -0.0019 -0.003 -0.0396* 0.0600* -0.0326* -0.004 0.0546* 0.0526* 0.0129 -0.1406* 1     
ROA (12) -0.0745* 0.0229 0.0983* 0.1621* -0.0403* 0.0146 0.0041 0.5182* -0.2047* -0.1258* 0.2118* 1    
PPE (13) 0.0962* 0.0235 -0.0427* -0.0285 -0.0103 0.0745* 0.1939* -0.1585* 0.1940* -0.3280* 0.6743* 0.1076* 1   
S_CASH (14) -0.0722* 0.0681* 0.1186* 0.1261* 0.0212 -0.0844* -0.1292* 0.5615* -0.3500* 0.5045* -0.0009 0.5165* -0.2077* 1  
VOLATILITYD (15) -0.0388* -0.1656* -0.1875* -0.0692* 0.0037 -0.1112* -0.2846* -0.0710* 0.0556* 0.1665* 0.0109 -0.2601* -0.0548* -0.0773* 1 
 
* Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01). 
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Table 3. The Impact of CEO risk-taking incentives on socially irresponsible activities 
 
 1992-2006 2007-2012 1992-2012 
 OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV 
VEGAt-1 0.0260*** 0.0214*** 0.0219*** 0.0411*** 0.0114 -0.0237** -0.0040 -0.0039 0.0249*** 0.0103* 0.0125** 0.0241** 
 (3.88) (2.85) (3.21) (3.59) (0.84) (-2.24) (-0.43) (-0.19) (3.82) (1.67) (2.14) (2.14) 
STRt-1 0.0968*** 0.0371 0.0659*** 0.0816*** -0.0101 -0.1607*** -0.1089*** 0.0002 0.0079 -0.0650*** -0.0453*** 0.0116 
 (3.10) (1.22) (2.71) (2.66) (-0.58) (-9.99) (-8.66) (0.01) (0.48) (-4.96) (-3.64) (0.68) 
DELTA
 t-1 -0.0015*** -0.0016 -0.0018** -0.0016*** 0.0009 -0.0033*** -0.0017 0.0005 -0.0014*** -0.0015 -0.0016** -0.0013** 
 (-3.35) (-1.52) (-2.50) (-2.96) (0.56) (-2.60) (-1.53) (0.43) (-2.80) (-1.52) (-2.13) (-2.33) 
TENURE_CUM
 t-1 -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0007* -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** 
 (-4.66) (-3.36) (-4.57) (-4.57) (-3.59) (-1.72) (-3.22) (-3.61) (-5.29) (-2.82) (-4.07) (-5.14) 
AGE
 t-1 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 
 (2.20) (2.21) (3.18) (2.23) (1.95) (2.19) (2.90) (1.99) (2.62) (2.08) (3.06) (2.55) 
SIZE
 t-1 0.0230*** 0.0074** 0.0203*** 0.0221*** 0.0212*** 0.0158*** 0.0249*** 0.0237*** 0.0230*** 0.0127*** 0.0208*** 0.0236*** 
 (15.63) (2.29) (15.50) (12.39) (11.49) (4.19) (14.11) (10.42) (17.10) (5.70) (18.40) (14.19) 
BLEVERAGE
 t-1 -0.0154* 0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0065 -0.0103** -0.0076** -0.0082*** -0.0161*** -0.0164*** -0.0037 -0.0062* -0.0154*** 
 (-1.77) (0.34) (-0.37) (-0.84) (-2.43) (-2.04) (-2.62) (-3.02) (-3.39) (-0.90) (-1.69) (-3.12) 
R&D
 t-1 0.0753** 0.0881* 0.0737*** 0.0655** 0.0609 0.0314 0.0573** 0.0629 0.0641** 0.0367 0.0481** 0.0634** 
 (2.26) (1.88) (2.85) (2.00) (1.60) (0.72) (2.32) (1.64) (2.25) (0.92) (2.17) (2.21) 
CAPEX
 t-1 -0.0405 0.0189 0.0053 -0.0190 -0.1048*** 0.0436* 0.0056 -0.1169*** -0.0762*** 0.0521*** 0.0238 -0.0774*** 
 (-1.20) (0.87) (0.27) (-0.60) (-2.98) (1.82) (0.27) (-3.35) (-2.70) (2.75) (1.41) (-2.79) 
ROA
 t-1 -0.0202 -0.0017 -0.0129 -0.0230 0.0007 -0.0126 -0.0111 0.0044 -0.0081 -0.0177 -0.0163 -0.0107 
 (-1.07) (-0.08) (-0.81) (-1.23) (0.04) (-0.95) (-0.97) (0.23) (-0.51) (-1.32) (-1.38) (-0.67) 
PPE
 t-1 -0.0046 -0.0001 0.0159** -0.0066 0.0226* 0.0287 0.0216** 0.0234* 0.0102 -0.0028 0.0119* 0.0107 
 (-0.46) (-0.00) (2.09) (-0.66) (1.70) (1.41) (2.46) (1.79) (1.08) (-0.19) (1.72) (1.13) 
S_CASH
 t-1 -0.0323** -0.0062 -0.0097 -0.0380** -0.0433** 0.0108 -0.0043 -0.0388** -0.0361** 0.0020 -0.0044 -0.0353** 
 (-2.06) (-0.49) (-0.84) (-2.43) (-2.29) (0.91) (-0.38) (-2.15) (-2.58) (0.20) (-0.45) (-2.51) 
VOLATILITYD
 t-1 0.0431*** 0.0273*** 0.0319*** 0.0437*** 0.0252*** -0.0056 0.0078 0.0297*** 0.0386*** 0.0222*** 0.0277*** 0.0382*** 
 (5.35) (3.77) (5.27) (5.73) (3.17) (-0.89) (1.37) (3.53) (6.37) (4.14) (5.80) (6.27) 
MB
 t-1 0.0010 0.0008 0.0018** 0.0007 0.0044*** -0.0011 0.0023** 0.0039*** 0.0025*** 0.0021** 0.0029*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.96) (0.91) (2.41) (0.66) (3.17) (-0.87) (2.27) (3.09) (2.82) (2.41) (4.04) (2.82) 
Constant -0.1144*** -0.0345 -0.1141***  0.0062 -0.0896*** -0.1708***  -0.0744** -0.0696*** -0.1500***  
 (-3.67) (-1.17) (-9.58)  (0.13) (-2.65) (-10.32)  (-2.03) (-3.24) (-13.63)  
Fixed effects Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, 
Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, 
Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, 
Year 
Observations 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 5,603 5,603 5,603 6,378 13,166 13,166 13,166 13,166 
R-squared (overall) 0.415 0.179 0.340 - 0.378 0.433 0.311 - 0.392 0.309 0.311 - 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.409 0.176 - - 0.372 0.432 - - 0.388 0.307 - - 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) - - - 0.000 - - - 0.537 - - - 0.166 
Endogeneity test (p-value) - - - 0.274 - - - 0.4212 - - - 0.937 
Number of firms 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,415 1,415 1,415 1446 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 
All variables are defined in Appendix I. Unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Robust and clustered (by firm) t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4. The moderating effect of socially responsible activities on the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially 
irresponsible activities 
 1992-2006 2007-2012 1992-2012 
 OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV 
VEGAt-1 0.0057 0.0070 0.0059 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0182 -0.0028 -0.0178 0.0178** 0.0104 0.0120* 0.0057 
 (0.69) (0.84) (0.78) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-1.44) (-0.27) (-0.59) (2.51) (1.50) (1.89) (0.38) 
STRt-1 0.0223 -0.0111 0.0119 0.0002 -0.0360 -0.1482*** -0.1061*** -0.0181 -0.0161 -0.0647*** -0.0467*** -0.0402 
 (0.67) (-0.29) (0.39) (0.00) (-1.44) (-7.67) (-6.55) (-0.51) (-0.80) (-3.65) (-2.81) (-1.18) 
(VEGA * STR)
 t-1 0.2675** 0.1613** 0.1936*** 0.3740*** 0.0690* -0.0301 -0.0064 0.0497 0.0629* -0.0009 0.0041 0.1386* 
 (2.56) (2.38) (2.69) (3.73) (1.79) (-0.73) (-0.20) (0.64) (1.80) (-0.03) (0.14) (1.84) 
DELTA
 t-1 -0.0014*** -0.0016 -0.0017** -0.0013** 0.0009 -0.0033*** -0.0017 0.0007 -0.0014*** -0.0015 -0.0016** -0.0012** 
 (-3.07) (-1.51) (-2.41) (-2.32) (0.59) (-2.59) (-1.52) (0.59) (-2.77) (-1.53) (-2.15) (-2.14) 
TENURE_CUM
 t-1 -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0012*** -0.0007* -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0013*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0013*** 
 (-4.48) (-3.17) (-4.35) (-4.08) (-3.48) (-1.74) (-3.22) (-3.19) (-5.23) (-2.81) (-4.08) (-4.78) 
AGE
 t-1 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0003* 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.0003* 0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 
 (2.06) (2.11) (3.03) (1.94) (1.92) (2.20) (2.90) (1.89) (2.59) (2.09) (3.07) (2.36) 
SIZE
 t-1 0.0233*** 0.0082*** 0.0208*** 0.0235*** 0.0218*** 0.0157*** 0.0249*** 0.0242*** 0.0233*** 0.0127*** 0.0209*** 0.0240*** 
 (15.57) (2.60) (15.66) (13.03) (12.27) (4.16) (14.25) (9.94) (17.42) (5.68) (18.39) (14.39) 
BLEVERAGE
 t-1 -0.0152* 0.0053 -0.0020 -0.0125 -0.0102** -0.0078** -0.0082*** -0.0163*** -0.0162*** -0.0037 -0.0062* -0.0152*** 
 (-1.78) (0.52) (-0.28) (-1.62) (-2.41) (-2.08) (-2.63) (-3.06) (-3.35) (-0.90) (-1.71) (-3.10) 
R&D
 t-1 0.0715** 0.0859* 0.0731*** 0.0730** 0.0645* 0.0320 0.0569** 0.0670* 0.0654** 0.0366 0.0482** 0.0673** 
 (2.19) (1.85) (2.85) (2.28) (1.71) (0.73) (2.31) (1.73) (2.31) (0.92) (2.19) (2.37) 
CAPEX
 t-1 -0.0444 0.0187 0.0041 -0.0345 -0.1056*** 0.0443* 0.0055 -0.1141*** -0.0770*** 0.0521*** 0.0233 -0.0734*** 
 (-1.33) (0.86) (0.20) (-1.08) (-2.99) (1.85) (0.26) (-3.23) (-2.73) (2.74) (1.38) (-2.61) 
ROA
 t-1 -0.0211 -0.0023 -0.0136 -0.0223 0.0007 -0.0125 -0.0111 0.0054 -0.0082 -0.0178 -0.0163 -0.0092 
 (-1.13) (-0.11) (-0.86) (-1.21) (0.04) (-0.94) (-0.97) (0.28) (-0.51) (-1.32) (-1.38) (-0.58) 
PPE
 t-1 -0.0032 0.0029 0.0164** -0.0035 0.0223* 0.0290 0.0217** 0.0222* 0.0104 -0.0028 0.0120* 0.0100 
 (-0.31) (0.15) (2.16) (-0.34) (1.68) (1.42) (2.47) (1.68) (1.11) (-0.19) (1.74) (1.05) 
S_CASH
 t-1 -0.0289* -0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0280* -0.0431** 0.0106 -0.0045 -0.0390** -0.0353** 0.0020 -0.0045 -0.0342** 
 (-1.85) (-0.24) (-0.55) (-1.77) (-2.29) (0.89) (-0.39) (-2.17) (-2.54) (0.20) (-0.46) (-2.45) 
VOLATILITYD
 t-1 0.0447*** 0.0276*** 0.0324*** 0.0447*** 0.0243*** -0.0054 0.0079 0.0289*** 0.0387*** 0.0222*** 0.0278*** 0.0385*** 
 (5.54) (3.81) (5.36) (5.79) (3.08) (-0.84) (1.39) (3.41) (6.38) (4.14) (5.83) (6.31) 
MB
 t-1 0.0012 0.0010 0.0019** 0.0010 0.0045*** -0.0012 0.0023** 0.0040*** 0.0026*** 0.0021** 0.0029*** 0.0026*** 
 (1.11) (1.03) (2.55) (0.89) (3.35) (-0.94) (2.25) (3.17) (2.94) (2.42) (4.07) (2.93) 
Constant -0.1116*** -0.0383 -0.1157***  0.0032 -0.0900*** -0.1706***  -0.0756** -0.0696*** -0.1506***  
 (-3.53) (-1.33) (-9.69)  (0.07) (-2.65) (-10.38)  (-2.06) (-3.23) (-13.70)  
Fixed effects Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, Year Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, Year Industry, 
Year 
Firm, Year Firm, Year Industry, Year 
Observations 6,788 6,788 6,788 6,788 5,603 5,603 5,603 6,378 13,166 13,166 13,166 13,166 
R-squared (overall) 0.421 0.183 0.348 - 0.379 0.434 0.348 - 0.392 0.309 0.329 - 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.415 0.180 - - 0.372 0.432 - - 0.389 0.307 - - 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) - - - 0.266 - - - 0.390 - - - 0.265 
Endogeneity test (p-value) - - - 0.783 - - - 0.333 - - - 0.7409 
Number of firms 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,415 1,415 1,415 1446 1,859 1,859 1,859 1859 
All variables are defined in Appendix I. Unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Robust and clustered (by firm) t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. The Impact of CEO risk-taking incentives on socially irresponsible activities for firms with low and high levels of socially 
responsible activities 
 
 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period 
 
Low STR High STR Low STR High STR 
  OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV OLS FE RE IV 
VEGAt-1 0.0230** 0.0187 0.0185* 0.0295* 0.0191*** 0.0226*** 0.0215*** 0.0308*** 0.0184 -0.0116 -0.0009 -0.0311 -0.0008 -0.0280** -0.0120 0.0047 
 
(1.98) (1.48) (1.92) (1.77) (2.91) (3.10) (3.24) (2.61) (1.14) (-0.47) (-0.06) (-1.06) (-0.06) (-2.24) (-1.10) (0.29) 
STRt-1 -0.3180** 0.0175 -0.1358 -0.3326** 0.0743* 0.0400 0.0511 0.0604* -0.5936*** -0.4940** -0.5216*** -0.6428*** -0.0047 -0.1148*** -0.0653*** -0.0072 
 
(-2.01) (0.10) (-0.99) (-2.09) (1.95) (1.03) (1.59) (1.67) (-2.95) (-2.37) (-3.18) (-3.42) (-0.26) (-5.21) (-4.07) (-0.39) 
DELTA
 t-1 0.0003 0.0019 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0018*** -0.0018 -0.0019** -0.0017*** 0.0053** -0.0030 0.0021 0.0046** -0.0013 -0.0037*** -0.0020* -0.0009 
 
(0.28) (1.53) (0.79) (0.65) (-3.68) (-1.58) (-2.46) (-3.02) (2.32) (-1.02) (1.06) (2.31) (-0.81) (-2.70) (-1.72) (-0.73) 
TENURE_CUM
 t-1 -0.0012*** -0.0024*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0020*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0013** -0.0009 -0.0011** -0.0011** 
 
(-3.05) (-3.13) (-3.49) (-3.26) (-2.76) (-3.14) (-3.57) (-3.08) (-0.09) (-0.12) (0.24) (-0.22) (-2.43) (-1.21) (-2.53) (-2.26) 
AGE
 t-1 0.0002 0.0008** 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005* 0.0004 
 
(1.14) (2.34) (2.32) (0.94) (0.56) (1.51) (1.93) (0.56) (0.55) (0.73) (0.74) (0.64) (1.59) (0.56) (1.87) (1.21) 
SIZE
 t-1 0.0179*** 0.0011 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.0269*** 0.0117*** 0.0244*** 0.0260*** 0.0060*** 0.0065 0.0083*** 0.0092*** 0.0330*** 0.0290*** 0.0327*** 0.0314*** 
 
(8.29) (0.25) (9.10) (7.40) (13.99) (2.73) (14.51) (12.55) (3.31) (1.45) (4.80) (4.35) (13.11) (3.53) (14.15) (11.80) 
BLEVERAGE
 t-1 0.0016 0.0178 0.0074 0.0012 -0.0305** -0.0146 -0.0145 -0.0172 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0066 -0.0094 -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0130 
 
(0.17) (1.18) (0.85) (0.14) (-2.21) (-0.98) (-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.05) (-0.70) (-1.12) (-1.31) (-1.54) (-0.91) (-1.27) (-1.60) 
R&D
 t-1 0.0671 0.0320 0.0547* 0.0577 0.0723 0.0827 0.0713* 0.0616 0.0213 -0.0385 0.0127 0.0398 -0.0151 0.0799 0.0040 -0.0162 
 
(1.60) (0.56) (1.72) (1.42) (1.46) (1.21) (1.85) (1.25) (0.69) (-0.74) (0.54) (1.25) (-0.22) (0.83) (0.09) (-0.24) 
CAPEX
 t-1 -0.0139 0.0299 -0.0055 -0.0224 -0.0857* 0.0316 0.0087 -0.0653 -0.0410 0.0923*** 0.0212 -0.0316 -0.1823*** 0.0381 -0.0214 -0.1877*** 
 
(-0.40) (0.90) (-0.20) (-0.67) (-1.77) (1.06) (0.33) (-1.40) (-1.36) (2.78) (0.84) (-1.02) (-2.97) (0.85) (-0.55) (-3.02) 
ROA
 t-1 0.0070 0.0203 0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0290 -0.0092 -0.0197 -0.0382 0.0097 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0097 -0.0057 -0.0233 -0.0145 0.0096 
 
(0.24) (0.75) (0.05) (-0.09) (-1.09) (-0.33) (-0.86) (-1.45) (0.60) (0.01) (-0.15) (0.59) (-0.16) (-0.74) (-0.62) (0.28) 
PPE
 t-1 0.0052 -0.0150 0.0165* 0.0083 -0.0163 -0.0086 0.0124 -0.0107 0.0107 -0.0009 -0.0033 0.0070 0.0319 0.0716 0.0336** 0.0238 
 
(0.48) (-0.53) (1.88) (0.77) (-1.03) (-0.31) (1.10) (-0.68) (0.70) (-0.04) (-0.34) (0.45) (1.48) (1.63) (2.39) (1.17) 
S_CASH
 t-1 -0.0160 0.0081 -0.0007 -0.0102 -0.0529** -0.0106 -0.0114 -0.0535** -0.0025 0.0106 0.0025 -0.0006 -0.0765** -0.0129 -0.0405* -0.0833*** 
 
(-0.70) (0.49) (-0.04) (-0.47) (-2.21) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-2.28) (-0.15) (0.72) (0.21) (-0.04) (-2.25) (-0.52) (-1.84) (-2.71) 
VOLATILITYD
 t-1 0.0344*** 0.0180* 0.0294*** 0.0333*** 0.0429*** 0.0308*** 0.0339*** 0.0458*** 0.0283*** 0.0070 0.0187*** 0.0237*** 0.0305** -0.0210 0.0077 0.0431*** 
 
(3.26) (1.74) (3.62) (3.25) (3.86) (2.91) (3.80) (4.44) (3.94) (0.94) (3.08) (3.05) (2.06) (-1.53) (0.67) (2.79) 
MB
 t-1 0.0018 -0.0006 0.0026** 0.0018 0.0015 0.0005 0.0010 0.0016 0.0009 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 0.0072*** -0.0001 0.0042** 0.0058*** 
 
(1.22) (-0.38) (2.08) (1.22) (1.08) (0.46) (1.03) (1.06) (0.65) (0.12) (0.23) (0.81) (3.02) (-0.07) (2.49) (2.76) 
Constant -0.0626** -0.0290 -0.0925***  -0.0924** -0.0180 -0.1366***  0.0524* -0.0326 -0.0442***  -0.1044 -0.1802** -0.2418***  
  (-2.06) (-0.72) (-5.40)  (-2.08) (-0.44) (-8.31)  (1.70) (-0.93) (-3.13)  (-1.58) (-2.16) (-9.70)  
Fixed effects Industry, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Industry, 
Year Firm, Year Firm, Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Firm, 
Year Firm, Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Industry, 
Year Firm, Year Firm, Year 
Industry, 
Year 
Observations 2,531 2,531 2,531 2,531 3,455 3,455 3,455 3,455 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,654 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,870 
R-squared (overall) 0.264 0.195 0.176 - 0.525 0.227 0.429 - 0.418 0.619 0.386 - 0.483 0.368 0.382 - 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.243 0.186 - - 0.516 0.221 - - 0.403 0.616 - - 0.47 0.364 - - 
Hansen J statistic (p-
value) - - - 0.353 - - - 0.001 - - - 0.783 - - - 0.103 
Endogeneity test (p-
value) - - - 0.904 - - - 0.35 - - - 0.065 - - - 0.794 
Number of firms 875 875 875 875 714 714 714 714 874 874 874 915 856 856 856 880 
All variables are defined in Appendix I. Unreported industry controls are based on the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Robust and clustered (by firm) t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix I. Variables definition 
Variable Code Definition Source 
Socially irresponsible and responsible activities 
Concerns CON Average of all qualitative issue areas’ scores related to socially irresponsible 
activities (concerns). KLD 
Strengths STR Average of all qualitative issue areas’ scores related to socially responsible activities (strengths). KLD 
CEO Characteristics 
Vega ($000s) VEGA Pay-risk sensitivity. Change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 0.01-unit 
change in stock return volatility. 
Core and Guay (2002);Coles Daniel and 
Naveen, (2006);Daniel Li and Naveen 
(2013). 
Delta ($000s) DELTA Pay-performance sensitivity. Change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in stock price. 
Core and Guay (2002);Coles Daniel and 
Naveen, (2006);Daniel Li and Naveen 
(2013). 
Tenure TENURE_CUM Number of years in CEO’s current term. Execucomp 
Age AGE Age (years) of the executive as reported in the annual proxy statement. Execucomp 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm size SIZE Log (Total Assets ) Compustat 
Book Leverage BLEVERAGE = (Long-Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) /Total Assets Compustat 
Research and development 
expenditure to assets R&D = Max(0, Research and Development Expense )/Total Assets Compustat 
Net capital expenditure to assets CAPEX = (Capital Expenditure – Sale of Property, Plant and Equipment)/Total Assets  Compustat 
ROA ROA = EBITDA /Total Assets  Compustat 
Net Property, Plant, and 
Equipment to assets PPE = Net Property, Plant, and Equipment/Total Assets Compustat 
Surplus Cash S_CASH 
Cash from assets-in-place to total assets = (Net Cash Flow from Operating 
Activities – Depreciation and Amortization + Research and Development Expense 
)/Total Assets 
Compustat 
Firm Risk (Stock return 
volatility) VOLATILITYD Standard deviation of daily returns CRSP 
Market-to-Book MB The  market-to-book ratio = (Total Assets – Common Equity + Price Close * Common Shares Outstanding)/Total Assets Compustat 
KLD refers to MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD Research & Analytics, Inc or KLD), Compustat refers to Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, and CRSP refers to 
the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. 
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Appendix II: MSCI ESG STATS (KLD)’s Concern and Strength 
Dimension Concerns (CON) Strengths (STR) 
Community 
- Investment Controversies 
- Negative Economic Impact 
- Indigenous Peoples Relations 
- Tax Disputes 
- Other Concern 
- Charitable Giving   
- Innovative Giving 
- Non-US Charitable Giving 
- Support for Housing 
- Support for Education 
- Indigenous Peoples Relations 
- Volunteer Programs  
- Other Strength 
 
Diversity 
- Controversies (e.g., fines) 
- Non-Representation 
- Other Concern 
- CEO’s identity - Promotion 
- Board of Directors - Work/Life Benefits 
- Women & Minority Contracting 
- Employment of the Disabled 
- Gay & Lesbian Policies - Other Strength 
Employee Relations 
- Union Relations 
- Health and Safety Concern 
- Workforce Reductions 
- Retirement Benefits Concern 
- Other Concern 
- Union Relations  
- No-Layoff Policy 
- Cash Profit Sharing 
- Employee Involvement 
- Retirement Benefits Strength 
- Health and Safety Strength 
- Other Strength 
Environment 
- Hazardous Waste 
- Regulatory Problems 
- Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
- Substantial Emissions 
- Agricultural Chemicals 
- Climate Change 
- Other Concern 
- Beneficial Products and Services 
- Pollution Prevention 
- Recycling  
- Clean Energy 
- Communications 
- Property, Plant, and Equipment 
- Management Systems  
- Other Strength 
Product 
- Product Safety 
- Marketing/Contracting Concern 
- Antitrust 
- Other Concern 
- Quality 
- R&D/Innovation 
- Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged 
- Other Strength 
Human Rights 
- South Africa (1991-1994) 
- Northern Ireland (1991-1994) 
- Burma Concern 
- Mexico (1995-2002) 
- Labor Rights Concern 
- Indigenous Peoples Relations 
Concern 
- Other Concern 
 
- Positive Record in South Africa (1994-
1995) 
- Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength 
- Labor Rights Strength 
- Other Strength 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
- High Compensation 
- Ownership Concern 
- Accounting Concern 
- Political Accountability Concern 
- Transparency Concern  
 - Other Concern 
- Limited Compensation 
- Ownership Strength 
- Transparency Strength 
- Political Accountability Strength 
- Other Strength 
 
Source: MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. or KLD).   
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Appendix III. Calculation of risk-taking incentives (Vega)18 
To calculate the incentives from options (delta and vega), we need firm-level variables, option-specific variables 
and an estimate of the risk-free rate corresponding to the maturity of the options as of fiscal year end. Firm-level 
variables include stock price at fiscal year end, an estimate of stock volatility19, and an estimate of dividend 
yield. Option-specific variables include the number of vested and unvested options, the exercise prices of the 
options, and the maturity of the options as of the fiscal year end (based on expiration date of the options).  
Following Core and Guay (2002), estimates of a stock option's sensitivity to stock price (delta) and stock-return 
volatility (vega) are calculated based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for valuing European call options, as 
modified to account for dividend payouts by Merton (1973). The call option value is given by:  
 
	 !"# = $#%&'() − +#,&'( − -'.))/ 
 
 
where 
 
( = $! 0+1 + '3 − 4 + -
./2/ /-'.) 
 = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
 = price of the underlying stock 
+ = exercise price of the option 
- = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
3 = natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate 
 = time to maturity of the option in years 
4 = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
The sensitivity of the call option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price (delta) is defined as: 
 
4#! = 	 $7'8 !!		 !"#)7'98:	38#) / × $
8:	38#
100 / = #
%&'() × $8:	38#100 / 
 
The sensitivity of the call option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock-return volatility (vega) is defined 
as: 
 
#> = 	 $7'8 !!		 !"#)7'98:	! !?) / × 0.01 = #
%&′'()B.C × '0.01) 
 
 
where ′ = normal density function.  
 
The delta of the CEO is the sum of the delta of all options (both vested and unvested), and the delta from the 
shares owned by the executive. The vega is the sum of the vega of all options (both vested and unvested). The 
vega of the CEO option portfolio is used as the primary measure of CEO risk-taking incentives, as an 
approximation of the total vega of the stock and option portfolio. It is assumed that vega of the stock portfolio is 
zero (Guay, 1999). The incentives from options (delta and vega) are computed as of fiscal year end for each 
CEO.  
                                                          
18
 This appendix is based on Core and Guay (2002), Coles et al., (2006), and Daniel et al., (2013).  
19
 The annualized standard deviation of stock returns estimated over the 60 months prior to the beginning of the 
fiscal period.  
